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RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SEARcH AND SEIZuRE-COMPLANCE WITH
ANNOUNCEMENT STATUTE NOT REQUIRED BEFORE FORCIBLE ENTRY WHERE
OFFICER'S PURPOSE IS "INVESTIGATORY" AND NOT FOR PURPOSE OF ARREST
In response to a radio report of a disturbance, the police officer on patrol
proceeded to a nearby rooming house. Upon arrival at the building, he heard
shouting, screaming and clapping of hands. The night manager informed him
that a fifth floor tenant was creating the disturbance and that it "had been going
on for several evenings."' The officer proceeded to the tenant's room and heard
"stamping of feet... rapid clapping of hands, and a male shouting at the top
of his lungs." 2 The policeman remained outside the room for fifteen seconds and
then knocked on the door, but did not identify himself or announce his purpose.
The noises stopped immediately and a male voice from within stated three times:
"Wait a minute. Wait a minute. I'm not dressed."3 After a minute's wait, the
officer, although holding no search or arrest warrant, directed the manager to
open the door with his passkey. As the door was opened, the officer observed
defendant holding a syringe, an eyedropper with a needle on the end of it. He
placed the defendant under arrest and seized the narcotics instruments. Subse-
quently, defendant moved to suppress this evidence, arguing that there was a
violation of section 178 of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure,4 because
the police officer had failed to state his identity and give notice of his purpose
before "breaking open" 5 the door to gain entry. The suppression motion was
denied and defendant was convicted of the misdemeanor of possession of nar-
cotics instruments in violation of section 1747-e of the New York Penal Law.0
1. People v. Gallmon, 19 N.Y.2d 389, 391, 227 N.E.2d 284, 285, 280 N.Y.S.2d 356,
358 (1967) [hereinafter cited as instant case].
2. Brief for Respondent, pp. 2-3, quoting Minutes, Suppression Hearing, Criminal Court,
City of New York, County of New York, pp. 4-5 (October 6, 1965), instant case.
3. Instant case at 391, 227 N.E.2d at 286, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 358.
4. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 178 provides:
To make an arrest, as provided in the last section, the officer may break open
an outer or inner door or window of a building, if, after notice of his office and
purpose, he be refused admittance.
The "last section" referred to in § 178 indicates the cases in which an officer may arrest
without a warrant. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 177 provides:
A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person, 1. For a crime,
committed or attempted in his presence, or where a police officer as enumerated in
section one hundred fifty-four-a of the code of criminal procedure, has reasonable
grounds for believing that an offense is being committed in his presence. 2. When
the person arrested has committed a felony, although not in his presence; 3. When
a felony has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable cause for believing the
person to be arrested to have committed it; 4. When he has reasonable cause for
believing that a felony has been committed, and that the person arrested has com-
mitted it, though it should afterward appear that no felony has been committed,
or, if committed, that the person arrested did not commit it; 5. When he has
reasonable cause for believing that a person has been legally arrested by a citizen
as provided in sections one hundred eighty-five, one hundred eighty-six and one
hundred eighty-seven of this code.
5. For a discussion of "breaking" within the meaning of the statute, see infra notes
15-19 and accompanying text.
6. N.Y. Pen. Law § 1747-e(3), (4), now N.Y. Rev. Pen. Law § 220.45, provided, in
part:
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, except a duly licensed physi-
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The Appellate Term, First Judicial Department, affirmed, without opinion.7 On
appeal, the Court of Appeals (4-3) affirmed the conviction. Held, since the police
officer's entry was investigatory and not to effect an arrest or seizure, section 178
of the Code of Criminal Procedure was not applicable and therefore the officer
was under no duty to give notice of office or purpose before entering; the officer's
entry was privileged pursuant to his general obligation to assist people in distress.
People v. Gallmon, 19 N.Y.2d 389, 227 N.E.2d 284, 280 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1967).
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees to all
persons the right to be secure in their houses against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 8 This has been interpreted to mean that law enforcement officers may
not enter a person's house and secure evidence for a criminal prosecution unless
authorized to do so "pursuant to a legal search warrant, by consent, or incident
to a lawful arrest,"9 and that where the search is found unreasonable by these
standards, any evidence obtained as a result of the unreasonable search is in-
admissible in both federal' 0 and state" courts. The instant case focuses on two
important concepts in the area of warrantless searches and seizures: the statutory
announcement requirement, establishing standards for lawful entry, and the
privileged entry in an emergency, allowing police, without warrant, to aid
persons in distress.
In many jurisdictions, a police officer, in making an arrest or in executing
process, may break open a door of a building only if he is refused admittance
after having given notice of his office and purpose. 12 Although these statutory
requirements of notice of identity and purpose embody principles long a part of
the common law,13 it was 1949 before an American court invalidated an arrest on
dan,... or those engaged in the regular business of dealing in medical, dental and
surgical supplies, ... to have under control or possess, a hypodermic syringe or
hypodermic needle, or any other instrument or implement adapted for the admin-
istering of narcotic drugs which other instrument or implement is possessed for that
purpose, unless such possession be obtained upon a valid written prescription ....
A violation of any provision of this section shall constitute a misdemeanor.
7. People v. Gallmon, N.Y.L.J., June 10, 1966, vol. 155, no. 113, p. 16, col. 5 (Sup.
Ct. 1966).
8. U.S. Const. amend. IV guarantees:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon problable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
See also N.Y. Const. art. I, § 12.
9. People v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 373, 179 N.E.2d 478, 482, 223 N.Y.S.2d 462, 466
(1961). Accord, Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 261-62 (1960) ; Henry v. United States,
361 U.S. 98, 100-02 (1959); People v. Stokes, 15 N.Y.2d 534, 202 N.E.2d 567, 254 N.Y.S.2d
123 (1964); People v. Yarmosh, 11 N.Y.2d 397, 184 N.E.2d 165, 230 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1962);
People v. O'Neill, 11 N.Y.2d 148, 182 N.E.2d 95, 227 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1962). See generally N.
Sobel, Current Problems in the Law of Search and Seizure (1964); Kaplan, Search and
Seizure: A No-Man's Land in Criminal Law, 49 Calif. L. Rev. 474 (1961).
10. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
11. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
12. See, e.g., Ala. Code tit. 15, § 155 (1959); Cal. Pen. Code § 844 (Deering 1954);
Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-1009 (Bums 1956); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-411 (1943); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 2935.12 (Baldwin 1964); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-807 (1955). See also ALI Code Crim.
Proc. ch. 1, § 28 (Proposed Final Draft, 1930).
13. Semayne's Case, 5 Coke 91, 11 E.R.C. 629, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (1603).
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the independent ground that an announcement of purpose was not made prior
to forcible entry.14 Moreover, the policy underlying the announcement require-
ment has been open to question, i.e., whether its purpose is to protect property
from invasion resulting in physical damage,15 or to safeguard the individual's
right to privacy as guaranteed by the fourth amendment.16 Despite historical
inferences to the contrary,17 the requirement that an officer announce his
identity and purpose and be refused admittance, before being permitted to break
into a private dwelling, is t day clearly founded in "the precious interest of
privacy summed up in the ancient adage that a man's house is his castle."' 8
Thus, any nonconsensual entry constitutes a "breaking," and the absence of a
physical or forcible "breaking" to gain entry does not remove the action of the
arresting officer from the ambit of the announcement requirement.19 The statu-
tory language requires compliance by police when their purpose in entering
private premises is to effectuate an arrest.2° Courts, in interpreting such statutes,
assume sub silientio that the purpose for seeking entrance was to arrest, and
then proceed to determine the legality or illegality of the entry.21 The instant
case takes a novel approach, by first determining the factual question of whether
the intended purpose of the police was in fact to make an arrest.22
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted announcement statutes
in two landmark decisions. In Miller v. United States, 23 the Court held that the
14. Accarino v. United States, 179 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1949). See generally Blakey,
The Rule of Announcement and Unlawful Entry: Miller v. United States and Ker v.
California, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 499, 511-12 (1964).
15. See Kaplan, supra note 9, at 502-03: "[T]he common-law history and purposes of
the statute [are] to protect property from the unnecessary injury of a forcible entry rather
than to guard the rights of privacy involved in the fourth amendment"
16. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958); Munoz v. United States, 325 F.2d
23 (9th Cir. 1963); Hair v. United States, 289 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
17. In United States v. Bowman, 137 F. Supp. 385, 388 (D.D.C. 1956) the court
stated that, "So long as the entry is peaceful and there is no breaking of parts of the house,
the execution of the search warrant is legal." See generally Kaplan, supra note 9.
18. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958).
19. Keiningham v. United States, 287 F.2d 126, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1960). See also Munoz
v. United States, 325 F.2d 23, 26 (9th Cir. 1963) (Entry into appellant's room by use of a
passkey obtained from the hotel clerk amounts to the same thing as a physical breaking of
the door.).
20. See, e.g., Cal. Pen. Code § 844 (Deering 1954) ("To make an arrest . . .a peace
officer may .... "); N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 178 ("To make an arrest .. . the officer
may .... ").
21. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 35 (1963); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301(1958); Hair v. United States, 289 F.2d 894, 895 (D.C. Cir. 1961); People v. Goldfarb,
34 Misc. 2d 866, 868, 229 N.Y.S.2d 620, 621 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1962).
22. Instant case at 391-92, 227 N.E.2d at 286, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 359. A related question
was raised in Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1963). While the court in
that case did not specifically discuss whether the District of Columbia announcement
statute is applicable only when the purpose of the police officer is to arrest or execute process,
it did find that to require compliance in case of an emergency would be to apply the statute
"to the point of utter absurdity ... would be a 'useless gesture.'" Id. at 210. It also stated
that "(Clompliance with § 3109 [the District of Columbia announcement statute] is not
the only source of authority by which police could lawfully enter private quarters . *
evidence of a fire or of escaping gas would warrant public authority to enter by any available
means if there was not a prompt response to knocking.' Id. at 212.
23. 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
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District of Columbia announcement statute24 demands strict compliance in the
form of "express announcement" of both the officer's identity and purpose.-s
Since federal officers had announced only their identity, the statutory require-
ments had not been fulfilled. Therefore, the entry was illegal and any evidence
obtained as a result of the unlawful entry must be suppressed.20 The Court went
on to state, however, that strict compliance with the announcement requirement
may be excused when the officers are "virtually certain" that both their identity
and purpose are already known and that, therefore, such an explicit statement
would be a "useless gesture." 21 In Ker v. California,28 the Court added another
exception to strict compliance with the announcement requirement, by holding
that the California-developed doctrine of "exigent circumstances" 29 was con-
stitutional. 30 The doctrine excuses announcement of identity and purpose where
the officer believes in good faith that compliance with the statute would increase
the possibility of peril to himself or someone within,' or that the person to be
arrested is fleeing or attempting to destroy evidence which would otherwise be
seized,32 or that the officer's purpose is "reasonably apparent" to the person to
be arrested.33 Conceding that there had not been strict compliance with the
California statute,34 the Court found an exigency justifying non-compliance,3 5
and held the entry lawful and the evidence admissible.3 8
24. 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1964) provides:
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or
any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after
notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance....
25. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 309 (1958).
26. Id. at 314.
27. Id. at 310.
28. 374 U.S. 23, 37 (1963).
29. People v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 294 P.2d 6, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 858 (1956);
People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955). See also People v. Hammond, 54
Cal. 2d 846, 357 P.2d 289, 9 Cal Rptr. 233 (1960).
30. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 38 (1963).
31. People v. Hammond, 54 Cal. 2d 846, 854, 357 P.2d 289, 294, 9 Cal. Rptr. 233,
238 (1960); People v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 306, 294 P.2d 6, 9, cert. denied, 352 U.S.
858 (1956). See also Benefield v. State, 160 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1964).
32. People v. Hammond, 54 Cal. 2d 846, 854, 357 P.2d 289, 294, 9 Cal. Rptr, 233,
238 (1960); People v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 306, 294 P.2d 6, 9, cert. denied, 352 U.S,
858 (1956); People v. Arellano, 239 Cal. App. 2d 389, 392, 48 Cal. Rptr. 686, 688 (1966).
See also United States v. Figueroa, 323 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1963) ; United States v. Sharpe,
322 F.2d 117 (6th Cir. 1963); Masiello v. United States, 317 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1963);
Benefield v. State, 160 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1964).
33. People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955). See also United States
v. Nicholas, 319 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1963) ; Benefield v. State, 160 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1964).
34. Cal. Pen. Code § 844 (Deering 1954) provides:
To make an arrest, a private citizen, if the offense be a felony, and in all cases
a peace officer, may break open the door or window of the house in which the per-
son to be arrested is, or in which they have reasonable grounds for believing him to
be, after having demanded admittance and explained the purpose for which admit-
tance is desired.
35. In Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40-41 (1963), the Court stated that:
In the particular circumstances of this case, the officers' method of entry,
sanctioned by the law of California, was not unreasonable under the standards of
the Fourth Amendment as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.
36. Id. at 42-44.
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New York development in this area closely parallels the Supreme Court
decisions in Miller and Ker.37 Similar to the holding in Miller is the narrow
interpretation given section 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure s in People
v. Griffin. 9 In Griffin, the Appellate Division, Second Department, required
suppression of evidence where police officers broke into an apartment after
having given notice of identity but not purpose. 4° Parallelling Ker is the recent
case of People v. Mcllwain,41 also decided by the Appellate Division, Second
Department. Finding that the record established that vital evidence was about
to be destroyed,42 the Court held that such "exigent circumstances" justified the
arresting officers' noncompliance with section 178 of the New York Code of
Criminal Procedure.43 Despite noncompliance, then, the arrest was lawful, the
search was valid as incident to that lawful arrest, and the motion to suppress
should have been denied.44
37. The preceding analysis of Miller and Ker is intended only to state those rules of
law enunciated by the Supreme Court which are relevant to the discussion of the instant
case. Admittedly, this examination has been oversimplified. There are conflicts and subtleties
presented by those cases which go beyond the scope of the present discussion, e.g., the
distinction between the Supreme Court's supervisory and constitutional functions as they
relate to rules of suppression of evidence; the question of whether Miller involved District
of Columbia law or federal law, and the consequences resulting from that determination;
and the reasons for the apparent conflict between the rigorous standard that federal officials
must meet and the more permissive standards which the Supreme Court may allow the
states to establish. For an excellent discussion of these and other problems raised by Miller
and Ker, see Blakey, The Rule of Announcement and Unlawful Entry: Miller v. United
States and Ker v. California, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 499 (1964). See also Note, 11 U.C.L.A.L.
Rev. 426 (1963); The Supreme Court, 1962 Tern, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 62, 113-16 (1963).
The concern of the Supreme Court itself that it was establishing a double standard for
federal and state officials can be seen in an analysis of the justices' votes in Ker. As pointed
out in B. J. George, Constitutional Limitations on Evidence in Criminal Cases 44-45 (1966),
On rationale [in Ker] the Court split 4-4-1. Four justices in the majority group felt
that lawfulness [of the entry by police] should be determined according to state law.
The four dissenters insisted that the standard had to be a federal one, and that
under Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958), federal officers could not legally
have done what California law permitted state officers to do. They concluded,
therefore, that the search of Ker's apartment violated Fourteenth Amendment due
process. Justice Harlan concurred, but assumed that 'henceforth state searches and
seizures are to be judged by the same constitutional standards as apply in the
federal system.'
38. See quote at supra note 4.
39. 22 A.D.2d 957, 256 N.Y.S.2d 115 (2d Dep't 1964).
40. Id. at 957, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 116. See also People v. Goldfarb, 34 Misc. 2d 866,
229 N.Y.S.2d 620 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1962) (The preemptory command to "open up" does
not constitute sufficient compliance with § 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.).
41. 28 A.D.2d 711, 281 N.Y.S.2d 218 (2d Dep't 1967).
42. Id. at 220.
43. Id. at 221.
44. Id. The Court in McIlwain relies on Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) and
People v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 294 P.2d 6, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 858 (1956), as judicial
recognition of the "exigent circumstances" exception to the statutory announcement re-
quirement, and on N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 799 as legislative recognition of the exception.
Section 799 provides that if a judge, in issuing a search warrant, believes that the evidence
sought may be quickly destroyed or that there is peril to the officer or another, he may
authorize the officer to break in without notice of office or purpose. It was held constitutional
by the state's highest court in People v. DeLago, 16 N.Y.2d 289, 213 N.E.2d 659, 266
N.Y.S.2d 353 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 963 (1966). Relying on footnote one of Chief
judge Fuld's dissent in the instant case ("There may, at times, be 'exigent circumstances'
requiring unannounced entry by law enforcement officials--e.g., to prevent destruction of
227
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As the statutory requirement of announcement may be excused in "exigent
circumstances," 45 similarly police officers need not comply strictly with the
requirements of the fourth amendment when fulfilling their general obligation
to assist people in distress.46 An emergency creates an exception to the rule that
a search of private premises must be pursuant to a legally issued warrant.47
Some courts have described the, exception as another form of "exigent circum-
stance," excusing compliance with both the fourth amendment and the ap-
plicable announcement statute,48 others as a "privilege" to enter to render aid.49
Where such a privilege is found to exist, it is a limited privilege, 0 justifying
an otherwise illegal entry only when the police officer "is prompted by the
motive of preserving life or property and [it] reasonably appears to the [officer]
to be necessary for the purpose." 51
A warrant is not required to break down a door to enter a burning
home to rescue occupants or extinguish a fire, to prevent a shooting or
to bring emergency aid to an injured person. The need to protect or
preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be
otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency. ... People could
well die in emergencies if police tried to act with the calm deliberation
associated with the judicial process. 52
This emergency doctrine, conferring on the police officer the privilege of entry
without warrant has been held to apply where the police beard several moans
evidence . . . " Instant case at 389, 227 N.E.2d at 288, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 362 (dissenting
opinion), n.1.) the Court in Mcllwain holds that N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 799 "together
with the footnote to Chief Judge Fuld's dissent in Gallmon (supra), with its citation of Ker,
clearly indicates that the doctrine of 'exigent circumstances' applies in New York as well as
in California," and permits noncompliance with N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 178 where such
circumstances are found to exist. People v. McIlwain, 28 A.D.2d 711, 714, 281 N.Y.S.2d
218, 221 (2d Dep't 1967).
45. See supra, notes 28-36, 41-44 and accompanying text.
46. People v. Roberts, 47 Cal. 2d 374, 303 P.2d 721 (1956); Davis v. State, 236 Md,
389, 204 A.2d 76 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 966 (1965); State v. Lukus, 423 P.2d 49
(Mont. 1967); Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860
(1963) ; United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1004 (1964).
47. Davis v. State, 236 Md. 389, 395, 204 A.2d 76, 80 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
966 (1965).
48. Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 210, 212, 213 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denicd, 375
U.S. 860 (1963); People v. Arellano, 239 Cal. App. 2d 389, 48 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1966).
49. People v. Roberts, 47 Cal. 2d 374, 378, 303 P.2d 721, 723 (1956).
50. State v. Lukus, 423 P.2d 49, 53 (Mont. 1967).
51. People v. Roberts, 47 Cal. 2d 374, 377, 303 P.2d 721, 723 (1956).
52. Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 375 U.S. 860
(1963).
53. The privileged entry in emergency situations finds a striking parallel in the admin-
istrative search commonly conducted by health inspectors, where the fourth amendment
guarantee of individual privacy has been balanced against important health and safety
concerns of the state-the balance until recently tipping in favor of the latter. See Comment,
Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 30 Mo. L. Rev. 612 (1965); Comment,
Administrative Inspections and the Fourth Amendment-A Rationale, 65 Colum. L. Rev.
288 (1965). The Supreme Court in the landmark case of Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360
(1959), upheld the conviction of an individual who refused to permit a warrantless inspection
of private premises for the purpose of locating and abating a public nuisance, thus apparently
carving out an additional exception to the rule that warrantless searches are unreasonable
under the fourth amendment. It was not until June of 1967, in Camara v. Municipal Court,
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or groans coming from an apartment but received no response to their knock,54
where they heard loud screams in the dead of night coming from a room,5 5 and
where they received reports of an unconscious or dying woman locked in an
apartment.56 It has been found applicable where the investigating officers found
a body brutally beaten at the rear of a house and saw, through a window, the
feet of another person, but were unable to determine, without entry, whether
such feet were those of a person in distress.57 The doctrine has also been held to
justify a privileged entry where police, answering the apartment manager's
complaint of a cursing, raging man, received no reply from within when they
knocked and asked that the door be opened.58 Two factors are present in nearly
all of these cases, and are apparently prerequisite to invocation of the emergency
entry doctrine as justification for privileged entry: there is reasonable ground to
believe that someone is in distress and there is no response from within to the
officers' knocking on the door.59 Although the privilege to enter to aid one in
distress does not justify a search of the premises for some other purpose,60 once
lawfully inside the police are further privileged to seize any evidence of crime
exposed to their view."' Since a search is "good or bad when it starts and does
not change character from its success," 62 such evidence is admissible in a sub-
sequent criminal prosecutionP
In the instant case, Judge Breitel, for the majority, concluded that the
387 U.S. 523 (1967), that the Court overruled Frank, holding that such administrative
searches are "significant instrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment,
that such searches when authorized and conducted without a warrant procedure lack the
traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual .... " Id.
at 534. The Court in Camara added that its decision is not intended to foreclose promptinspections, "even without a warrant, that the law has traditionally upheld in emergency
situations," Id. at 539. It is submitted, however, that Camara, and its companion case, See
v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), tends, if not to weaken the conceptual foundation of thedoctrine of privileged entry in emergency situations, at least to indicate that a strongerpresumption in favor of the search warrant is demanded in such cases.
54. People v. Roberts, 47 Cal. 2d 374, 303 P.2d 721 (1956).
55. United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1004 (1964).56. Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963).
57. Davis v. State, 236 Md. 389, 204 A.2d 76 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 966 (1965).58. State v. Lukus, 423 P.2d 49 (Mont. 1967). The facts in Lukus are very similar to
those in the instant case. In both instances, the manager of a rooming house called thepolice to investigate a disturbance in defendant's apartment. The police in both cases
proceeded to the rooming house without an arrest or search warrant and, after knocking on
the door, entered defendant's room with a passkey provided by the manager. The only
major factual distinction between the two cases is that in Lukus there was no response to
the knocking of police, while in Gallmon defendant did answer the knock on his door.
59. See, e.g., Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212-13 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,375 U.S. 860 (1963) ; People v. Roberts, 47 Cal. 2d 374, 376-78, 303 P.2d 721, 722-23 (1956);State v. Lukus, 423 P.2d 49, 53 (Mont. 1967).
60. People v. Roberts, 47 Cal. 2d 374, 378, 303 P.2d 721, 723 (1956).
61. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 41-43 (1963).
62. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948). For a discussion of the principles
enunciated in Di Re, in terms of trespass and lawful entry, see N. Sobel, Current Problems in
the Law of Search and Seizure 47 (1964).
63. People v. Roberts, 47 Cal. 2d 374, 303 P.2d 721 (1956) ; Davis v. State, 236 Md.389, 204 A.2d 76 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 966 (1965) ; cf. People v. Capra, 17 N.Y.2d
670, 216 N.E.2d 610, 269 N.Y.S.2d 451 (1966).
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New York announcement statute64 requires notice of identity and purpose only
where the intended purpose of the police, in making the entry, is to effectuate
an arrest.65 The Court found that the officer did not enter defendant's apartment
to arrest, but rather to investigate a disturbance.6 6 Therefore, he was under no
obligation to comply with section 178 of the New York Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure.67 The Court then inquired whether entry by the police in the instant
case was "privileged," since no person may forcibly enter private premises with-
out a privilege to do so.68 Judge Breitel noted that such a privilege has tradi-
tionally been recognized in the case of an innkeeper or landlord going to the aid
of one of his tenants. 69 Finding it "criticilly significant" that a rooming house
was involved7 0 and that the night manager had summoned the police, the Court
invoked this traditional privilege given the landlord in case of emergency. 71
It also found a second related privilege to be involved: a police officer's privilege
to enter an apartment for the purpose of aiding one in distress, "a purpose often
independent of considerations affecting the criminal law."' 72 Recognizing the
potential danger of a rule of privileged entry by police, without warrant, in the
case of emergency,73 the Court enunciated a standard to be applied to determine
the necessity of such an entry: the privileged entry "requires a stronger basis
where the purpose of the entry is not to make an arrest or execute processY.
74
Reinforcing the standard, the Court stated that there is "a strong factual infer-
ence that an entry which results in an arrest or seizure of evidence was for the
purpose of effecting an arrest or seizure. That inference should prevail unless
the police establish a different purpose justified by objective evidence of a
64. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 178. See quote at supra note 4.
65. Instant case at 392, 227 N.E.2d at 286, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 359.
66. This finding by the Court runs directly contrary to the position maintained by the
People. The District Attorney's entire argument was based on the fact that the police
officer had probable cause to arrest for the crime of disorderly conduct. N.Y. Pen.
Law §§ 722(2), 722(5) now N.Y. Rev. Pen. Law § 240.20. He maintained, however,
that N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 178 was not violated since there was no "breaking"
within the meaning of the statute, relying on the theory that the statute requires a physical
breaking. But see supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text. In the alternative, he argued
that even if section 178 were held to apply to every nonconsensual entry, noncompliance
with the statute need not be enforced by the exclusionary rule, since the requirement of
announcement is imposed by statute and is not of constitutional dimension. But see, Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). See Brief for Respondent, pp. 3-7 instant case, 19 N.Y.2d
389, 227 N.E.2d 284, 280 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1967).
67. Instant case at 392, 227 N.E.2d at 286, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 359.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 392-93, 227 N.E.2d at 286-87, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 359-60, quoting de Wolf v.
Ford, 193 N.Y. 397, 403, 86 N.E. 527, 530 (1908):
If, for instance, there should be an outbreak of fire, a leakage of water or gas, or
any other emergency calling for immediate action in a room assigned to a guest, the
innkeeper and his servants must necessarily have the right to enter without regard
to the time of day or night and without consulting the wish or convenience of the
guest.
70. Id. at 392, 227 N.E.2d at 286, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 359.
71. Id. at 392-93, 227 N.E.2d at 286-87, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 359-60.
72. Id. at 394, 227 N.E.2d at 287, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
73. Id. at 394, 227 N.E.2d at 288, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
74. Id. at 392, 227 N.E.2d at 286, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 359.
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privileged basis for making the entry. ' 75 The Court found the evidence in the
instant case sufficient to overcome that inference, and also sufficient to character-
ize the entry by police as privileged.7 6 The entry having been found lawful, any
evidence of crime exposed to the view of police could lawfully be seizedY
7
Chief Judge Fuld, dissenting, was of the opinion that the entry by police
was unlawful, whether a violation of a statutory requirement or of a constitu-
tional right.78 "If the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant for
disorderly conduct 7 9 their entry into the defendant's room was illegal because
it was not preceded by 'notice of [their] office and purpose.' ",80 If, on the other
hand, the police did not have probable cause to arrest and did not enter de-
fendant's room for the purpose of arresting him, "there was a flagrant violation
of the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution."'' s  Chief Judge Fuld
noted that the fourth amendment requires that all entries into private premises
for the purpose of securing evidence of crime be either pursuant to a legal search
warrant, incident to a lawful arrest, or by consent.82 In the instant case, he
stated, there was admittedly no search warrant nor, according to the majority,
were the police seeking to effectuate an arrest.83 Thus, the Chief Judge reasoned,
only if there were consent to search could the entry by police be upheld as
constitutional.8 4 Since consent must be given by the "occupant" of the premises
to be searched,85 the night manager of the rooming house could not lawfully
consent to the entry and search of defendant's room.86 Although the night
manager may be permitted to enter a room in case of emergency, without con-
sent or with the implied consent of the occupant, Chief Judge Fuld could find no
support in the record for the claim that there was a "reasonable basis . . . for
believing . . . an emergency existed. 87 The manager was concerned about
"noise," not about an emergency. The fact that the "noise" stopped after the
police knocked and "that the defendant responded to the knock on the door with
his 'Wait a minute. I'm not dressed' thoroughly negates the idea that he was in
75. Id. at 395, 227 N.E.2d at 288, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 361-62.
76. Id. at 395, 227 N.E.2d at 288, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
77. Id. at 394, 227 N.E.2d at 287, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
78. Id. at 398, 227 N.E.2d at 290, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 364.
79. The contention that the police had probable cause to arrest for disorderly conduct,
the Chief judge noted, was "the position stoutly maintained by the People." He asserted
that the view of the majority of the Court, that the entrance was for an "investigatory"
purpose, was "at odds with the record." Instant case at 396 n.2, 227 N.E.2d at 289 n.2, 280
N.Y.S.2d at 362 n.2 (dissenting opinion).
80. Id. at 398, 227 N.E.2d at 290, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 364, citing N.Y. Code Crim. Proc.
§ 178, and Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958).




85. Id., citing Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966); Chapman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 610, 617 (1961) ; Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) ; Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
86. Instant case at 396-97, 227 N.E.2d at 289, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 363, citing Stoner v.
California, 376 U.S. 483, 489-90 (1964).
87. Id. at 397, 227 N.E.2d at 289, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 363.
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distress."88 The Chief Judge concluded, "Absent a specific intent, based on
some reasonable ground, to go into a room for the sole purpose of coping with
a suspected emergency, the manager's power to enter the premises for that
limited purpose may not be used to validate this unauthorized entry into the
defendant's room." 89
The Court in the instant case held that compliance with the New York
announcement statute is only required where the purpose of the police is to arrest
or execute process.90 While a literal reading of section 178 may lead to this
conclusion,91 an examination of the policy underlying the statute casts some
doubt on this interpretation. The purpose of the statute is to further the fourth
amendment guarantee of privacy by protecting the individual from unwarranted
forcible entry into his home.9 2 Thus, he should be given the opportunity to
know who seeks entry into his private premises and for what purpose, and then
to determine for himself whether to permit peaceable entry. The Court's holding
grants these rights where the individual is suspected of having committed a
crime, i.e., when entry is sought to effectuate an arrest.93 However, when the
police are entering only for some investigatory purpose, these rights are denied
the individual. 94 It is difficult to understand why the Court recognizes the right
of privacy in the arrest situation, but not when the purpose for entry is only
"investigatory." The United States Supreme Court recently resolved a similar
contradiction in an analogous area of the law, by holding that administrative
searches by health inspectors when conducted without a warrant lack the tradi-
tional safeguards of the fourth amendment.9 5 The Court there noted, "It is
surely anomolous to say that the individual and his private property are fully
protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of
criminal activity."96 The anomoly is equally striking in the case of the "in-
vestigatory" entry authorized by the Court of Appeals in the instant case. "To
say that a man suspected of crime has a right to protection against search of his
home without a warrant, but that a man not suspected of crime has no such
protection is a fantastic absurdity.!9T The right to individual privacy must
88. Id. at 397-98, 227 N.E.2d at 290, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 364.
89. Id. at 397, 227 N.E.2d at 289, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 364.
90. Id. at 392, 227 N.E.2d at 286, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 359.
91. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 178 provides: "To make an arrest, . . . the officer may
break open an outer or inner door or window of a building, if, after notice of his office and
purpose, he be refused admittance." (Emphasis added.)
92. See supra notes 8-22 and accompanying text.
93. Instant case at 392, 227 N.E.2d at 286, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 359.
94. Id.
95. Camara v. United States, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). See supra note 53.
96. Id. at 530. See also District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir.
1949), aff'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950): "The basic premise of the prohibition
against searches was not protection against self-incrimination; it was the common-law right
of man to privacy in his home, a right which is one of the indispensable ultimate essentials
of our concept of civilization. . . . It was not related to crime or suspicion of crime. It
belonged to all men, not merely to criminals, real or suspected."
97. District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd on other
grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950). (Emphasis added.)
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necessarily be balanced against other societal valuesY8 Surely that balance
should tip more strongly in favor of privacy when there is merely an investiga-
tory purpose than when the purpose is to protect society from suspected crimi-
nals by arresting them and seizing evidence of their alleged crimes. The Court
in the instant case initially seems to recognize this notion by requiring a
"stronger basis" for entry in the former situation. 9 It is submitted that since a
stronger basis for lawful entry is required when there is only a desire to investi-
gate, the procedures which police should be required to follow in such cases
should necessarily be more protective of individual privacy than those employed
when the entry is for purposes of arrest. On policy grounds, it would seem that
the minimal requirements of section 178 (to knock and announce identity and
purpose) should be required regardless of the purpose for which entry is sought,
except where there are legitimate exigent 1° or emergency circumstances. 10 1
The major portion of the Court's opinion deals with the doctrine of privi-
leged entry in emergency situations, an exception to the fourth amendment
search warrant requirement. Balancing the interest of individual privacy against
the value of preserving human life, the Court enunciates the rule that in
emergencies a police officer is privileged to enter private quarters without a
warrant and without announcing his identity and purpose.'0 2 The doctrine
recognizes that to require a police officer to obtain a search warrant before
responding to the screams of an apparently injured person, or groans coming
from a locked apartment, would be an absurd overemphasis on privacy at the
expense of human life.'," While the Court makes a wise policy choice in so
holding, it also recognizes the danger inherent in its ruling. 04 Therefore, to
protect against the possibility that police may take advantage of the emergency
entry doctrine to justify illegal entries, it requires a "stronger basis" for entry
where the purpose is not to arrest or to excute process.'0 5 The legal basis or
justification in the arrest situation is probable cause,0 6 which has been defined
as that situation "where 'the facts and circumstances within their [the arresting
officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information
[are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
98. See, e.g., Camara v. United States, 387 U.S. 523, 529 (1967); McDonald v.
United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948); Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963).
99. Instant case at 392, 227 N.E.2d at 286, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 359.
100. See supra notes 28-36, 41-44 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 45-63 and accompanying text.
102. Instant case at 392-94, 227 N.E.2d at 286-87, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 359-61.
103. See, e.g., United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
1004 (1964) (Policemen upon hearing loud screams in the dead of night, properly de-
manded entrance to the room, even though they had no warrant in their possession.) ; People
v. Roberts, 47 Cal. 2d 374, 303 P.2d 721 (1956) (Where officers entered apartment without
search warrant after having heard several moans or groans that sounded as if someone were
in distress, their entry was lawful and evidence was properly seized.).
104. Instant case at 394-95, 227 N.E.2d at 288, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
105. Id. at 392, 227 N.E.2d at 286, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 359.
106. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 180 (1965); Giordenello
v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 485-86 (1958) ; Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 5 (1927).
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belief that' an offense has been or is being committed."' 0 7 The Court's holding in
the instant case, then, requires a "stronger basis" than this probable cause
standard to find that an emergency justifies a privileged entry. While the Court
fails to define that basis with precision, the least that is required is a reasonable
ground for belief by the police, based on all the circumstances, that a person is
in distress.108 Enunciation of such a standard by the Court would seem to
indicate that the emergency entry doctrine is intended to be limited in scope and
application. However, the Court, in applying the doctrine to the facts, appears
to have ignored its own limiting standard.
The facts indicate that while there was a "disturbance" in the rooming
house, there was no "emergency" requiring immediate action to aid a person in
distress. Nor were there reasonable grounds to believe that there was an emer-
gency or that someone was in need of immediate assistance. Several factors lead
to this conclusion. No one was calling for help or emitting sounds of pain. The
disturbance had existed for several evenings before the manager decided to call
the police, °9 an indication that he did not view the situation as an emergency.
Moreover, it appears that the officer found no emergency requiring immediate
action, for he waited a full minute and fifteen seconds before breaking into
defendant's apartment."10 Probably the most important indication that there
was no emergency is that defendant immediately responded to the officer's knock
and asked that he wait a minute."' A man in distress would not have reacted in
such a manner. Indeed, other jurisdictions have recognized that only if a person
believed to be in distress fails to respond to a knock on the door by police is
there reason to believe that there is an emergency granting a privilege to enter
private premises." 2 It is submitted that defendant's prompt response to the
knock in the instant case negates any reasonable grounds for believing that he
was in distress, and thus fails to meet the standard of a basis for entry stronger
than probable cause. The fact that the emergency entry doctrine was found to
apply, despite the limiting standard enunciated by the Court, may lead to
further misapplication of the rule, which was intended to be a narrow exception
to the constitutional guarantee of privacy. If the Court could find, on these facts,
that the entry was not being made to effect an arrest, then it can be expected
107. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959), quoting in part Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925). For discussions of probable cause, see generally
Rothblatt, The Arrest: Probable Cause and Search Without a Search Warrant, 35 Miss. L.J.
252 (1964); Foote, Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. UJ,. Rev. 16 (1957); Paulsen,
Safeguards in the Law of Search and Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L. Rev. 65 (1957).
108. See, e.g., Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 860 (1963); Davis v. State, 236 Md. 389, 395-96, 204 A.2d 76, 80 (1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 966 (1965); State v. Lukus, 423 P.2d 49, 53 (Mont. 1967).
109. Instant case at 391, 227 N.E.2d at 285, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 358.
110. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, p. 3, citing, Minutes, Suppression Hearing, Crim-
inal Court, City of New York, County of New York, p. 9 (October 6, 1965), instant case,
19 N.Y.2d 389, 227 N.E.2d 284, 280 N.Y.S.2d 356.
111. Instant case at 391, 227 N.E.2d at 286, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 358.
112. See, e.g., Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212, 213 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963); People v. Roberts, 47 Cal. 2d 374, 378, 303 P.2d 721, 722
(1956); State v. Lukus, 423 P.2d 49, 51, 53 (Mont. 1967).
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that the emergency entry doctrine will be employed by police to justify other
improper entries and seizures which appear to be violations of section 178.
Courts may be tempted to accept the argument that the entry was for an in-
vestigatory purpose rather than for arrest, and in that way to circumvent the
intent of Mapp v. Ohio1 13 that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal arrest,
search or seizure is inadmissible in state courts."x 4 The "investigatory" purpose
rationale may be employed to sustain unlawful entries only because they result
in seizure of evidence of crime, a procedure contrary to the doctrine that a search
is "good or bad when it starts and does not change character from its success.' ' n 5
As in the instant case, courts may lose sight of the policy reasons for severely
limiting the emergency entry doctrine to true emergencies. It must be remem-
bered that the doctrine is only a limited exception to the fundamental guarantees
of the fourth amendment against invasion of individual privacy. It constitutes
judicial recognition that on balance the right of privacy is more vital to society
than virtually all other values save one, the preservation of human life. The
Court's application of the doctrine in the instant case dilutes the basic right of
privacy by making the preservation of human life a ready excuse to justify un-
warranted entries into private premises. 116
PAUL L. FRIEDmAN
113. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
114. Id.
115. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948).
116. Is there an analogy between the emergency entry doctrine as applied in the
instant case and the "stop-and-frisk" law, N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 180-a? In both cases,
is not a search conducted "in practice (though not in theory) at the officer's whim"? May
it not become "a pretext for the general search . . . without probable cause, which the
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to prevent"? People v. Sibron, 18 N.Y.2d 603, 606, 219
N.E.2d 196, 198, 272 N.Y.S.2d 374, 375 (1966) (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting). See also
People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 239, 248, 219 N.E.2d 595, 601, 273 N.Y.S.2d 217, 225 (1966)
(Fuld, I., dissenting).

